Abstract Iraq's food security has been profoundly affected by its oil-based economy, over three decades of conflict and its politics that have been shaped by authoritarian rentierism. The article outlines the political economy of food security in Iraq and how it has been shaped historically. It identifies various conditioning factors such as oil, conflict, environment, agricultural development strategies and institutional setups, such as the Public Distribution System (PDS), the world's largest public food program. It then disentangles these factors in an analysis of data from Gallup, Iraq Body Count and various international organizations to give an appreciation of the Iraqi food security situation since the end of the Saddam regime. Finally, it takes a look at views of Iraqi experts on current food security issues in Iraq, using the results of an online survey that was conducted from May-October 2015 among 152 Iraqi experts from academia, ministries and NGOs. Iraqis overwhelmingly identify political instability and bad governance as major challenges to food security; it is unlikely that mere technocratic policy prescriptions can improve food security in the absence of political stability and improved governance.
Introduction
It's politics, stupid! In few countries of the world has food security been so much affected by political developments as in Iraq. The rise (and fall) of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is only the latest event in a string of political impacts on food security. Iraq is not alone: large n-studies reveal that agriculture and food security are not only affected by conflict globally; their deterioration has also been a contributing effect on conflict itself (Koren and Bagozzi 2016) . This relationship is particularly pronounced in the Middle East (Maystadt et al. 2014) .
Iraq is a country with an oil-based economy that has suffered over three decades of conflict. The Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s was followed by the First Gulf War for the liberation of Kuwait and the multilateral UN sanctions regime in the 1990s that had a devastating effect on food security. It prompted food rationing under the Public Distribution System (PDS), which still exists today and is the world's largest food program. Finally, there was the US invasion in 2003 and domestic turmoil throughout the following decade. Conflict has profoundly affected Iraq's institutions and its food security. Agriculture and food security have been part of a system of patronage that increasingly complemented weak state institutions in the late Saddam years. Its exploitation of tribal and sectarian affiliations increased during Iraq's descent into civil war in the 2000s and highlights the importance of governance issues for food security. This article situates Iraqi food security within the country's political economy and explores how Iraqis view salient food security challenges based on quantitative and qualitative surveys.
First, materials and methods are discussed giving an overview of statistical sources and identifying issues of data reliability. To provide context, the following section outlines the political economy of food security in Iraq, agricultural policies and the crucial importance of the PDS. The paper then disentangles various influencing factors such as oil, conflict and broader economic development in a statistical analysis using data from Gallup, Iraq Body Count and various international organizations to give an appreciation of the Iraqi food security situation between 2008 and 2015. Finally, it takes a look at the views of Iraqi experts on current Iraqi food security, using the results of an online survey that was conducted from MayOctober 2015 among 152 Iraqi experts from academia, ministries and NGOs.
Materials and methods
Data quality in Iraq is weak. Capacities to collect data have been affected by conflict and have only been partially rebuilt after 2003 (US Government 2013; Republic of Iraq 2009 ). We first outline the political economy of food security in Iraq and its history based on published literature, grey material, newspaper reports and surveys by international organizations and agencies of the Iraqi government. The discussion of the written material is complemented by personal interviews with government officials and executives of international organizations and NGOs in Beirut in June 2015 and in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in September 2015.
Then we discuss the recent development of Iraqi food security in an analysis of statistics. There are considerable divergences between the food security assessments in the socioeconomic surveys by the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Bank and the International Labour Organization (ILO) that were conducted between 2007 (WFP et al. 2008 World Bank et al. 2008 ILO et al. 2013 ) and the food security perceptions of Iraqis in the representative Gallup World Poll surveys 2008-15. The former signal a slight improvement, the latter show that after an initial improvement in 2009 perceived food security in Iraq deteriorated after 2010. The percentage of people who did not have enough money to buy sufficient food stood at 25% in 2008, fell to 12% in the following year, increased then steadily to 22% by 2012 and jumped to 41% in 2013. It continued to grow to 48% in 2015 (Gallup 2016) .
We ran a correlation analysis of this variable against a number of other factors that could help to explain the deteriorating perception of food security in Iraq since 2010, such as (1) various other outcomes of the Gallup poll e.g. shelter and income, (2) the number of violent civilian deaths in Iraq according to the Iraq Body Count project, (3) Iraqi oil production according to BP Statistics, (4) annual average price of Brent benchmark crude according to the EIA, (5) GDP per capita figures of the IMF World Economic Outlook dataset as an indicator of macro-economic health and (6) the production of wheat, Iraq's most important staple crop.
Finally, we analyzed how Iraqi academics and experts view salient food security challenges in their country in a qualitative analysis. This raised several methodological issues. Who qualifies as an expert and how can he or she be reached?
Iraq used to enjoy a high degree of education compared with other countries in the region until the early 1990s. Since then its universities have been hollowed out, with the partial exception of the KRI, which has enjoyed relative tranquility and was able to provide better funding to its academic institutions. Universities suffered materially from sanctions in the 1990s and were drawn into the maelstrom of sectarian conflict after the US occupation in 2003. By 2005, 84% of academic institutions had suffered from looting and destruction (Schweitzer 2013a (Schweitzer , 2013b . Academics have been specifically targeted by killings and have been forced to emigrate. Those remaining have seen their freedom of speech curtailed and have been cut off from political consultation processes even more than during the Saddam era. Staffing decisions in ministries have been predicated on political and sectarian, not meritocratic considerations, which sheds a questionable light on the qualifications of at least some government executives (Al-Ali 2014). Still, the many academics who continue to work in Iraq under hostile conditions represent an invaluable collective network of knowledge and are crucial for the future of their country. Despite the politicization of hiring decisions there continues to be a recruitment flow from the universities, as academic qualifications are needed to run administrations, especially their mid-level executive functions (Personal interviews with Iraqi academics, Beirut and Erbil, June and September 2015) .
Given the security situation in Iraq, the resulting difficulty in conducting face-to-face interviews, the particular precarious situation of many Iraqi academics and the fact that they are only a minority of the overall population make them a hard-to-reach population. In contrast to many developed countries there is also no readily available roster of memberships in professional associations that could be used as a sampling frame and to initiate first contacts. This makes random sampling of the sub-population and even its concise definition difficult, if not impossible.
Under these conditions the Internet offers opportunities. Iraq has witnessed a tremendous expansion of mobile phone coverage, which stood at 86% in 2007. In contrast only 12% of the population owned a computer (World Bank et al. 2008) . By 2014, 99% of households had a mobile phone, but only 20% a landline, a number that has declined steadily from 37% in 2008 (Gallup 2016) . Mobile phones are crucial for internet access in Iraq with the use of social networks like Facebook and What's Up particularly popular.
For this study a questionnaire was developed with the help of the Research and Expertise Centre for Survey Methodology (RECSM) at Pompeu Fabra University in Barcelona. It was then pre-tested with a group of 38 Iraqi academics who participated in a training workshop of the Center for Iraq Studies (CIS) of the Friedrich-Alexander University of ErlangenNuremberg in August 2014. Afterwards the questionnaire was revised and translated into Arabic, including explanations and information to ensure free prior consent of survey participants.
An online survey with Survey Monkey was conducted among a snowball sample of Iraqi academics and experts between the end of May and October 2015 with all replies except for two received in the first two months. As a snowball sample it is not representative and may have coverage, sample and response bias (Fricker 2008) . The statistical methods that have been suggested to make respondent driven samples representative, require knowledge of the respective recruitment chains, which is gained by offering structured incentives (Johnston and Sabin 2010; Heckathorn 1997 ). This could not be established in this case for logistic reasons and because anonymity was crucial in gaining trust of the survey participants and safeguarding their privacy. Still, under the adverse conditions in Iraq, the snowball sample represents a unique window to explore views among Iraqi academics and experts about food security in the country. It has also been argued that non-probabilistic samples of virtual networks can increase sizes of samples and their representativeness (Baltar and Brunet 2012) and can be particularly suitable for sampling elusive sub-populations (Brickman Bhutta 2012).
Four kinds of access points were chosen to create the snowball sample: (1) an address list of 449 names of the Center for Iraq Studies (CIS) of the Friedrich-Alexander University of Erlangen-Nuremberg, which has conducted workshops and training with academics from all over Iraq since 2009. Most of these academics were economists, followed by other social sciences and engineers. As such they represented disciplinary specializations that are particularly relevant for the multifaceted issue of food security, (2) a request with detailed instructions for further distribution of the survey link was sent to 53 contacts from various backgrounds, ranging from journalism, international organizations, consultancy, NGOs, government institutions, embassies and academics, (3) separately a list of 153 e-mail addresses was gleaned from publicly available information on websites of universities and ministries. Finally, (4) a Facebook page explaining the survey was created and mentioned in the respective cover letters of (1)-(3) to offer further possibilities of distribution. There were 9.4% of the e-mail addresses of the CIS list that bounced, the response rate of the remaining 407 was 16.7%. In comparison the web generated list had no responses at all, underlining the importance of prior contact via the CIS. Altogether there were 185 replies with 152 completed. Of the total of 185, 68 came from the CIS list and 117 entered the survey via the publicly available web link.
The political economy of food security in Iraq The sanctions period 1990 The sanctions period -2003 While the Iraqi government managed to maintain food supplies during the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s reasonably well, food security deteriorated massively in the wake of the multilateral UN embargo that was implemented after Iraq's occupation of Kuwait (1990-91) (Gordon 2010; Drèze and Gazdar 1992; Koc et al. 2007 ). Food availability was compromised; by the mid-1990s parts of the population were on the verge of starvation, before sanction relief under the Oil for Food program brought a modicum of improvement. The program was signed in 1996 and first food deliveries arrived in March 1997 (Marr 2012) .
The food-rationing program of the Public Distribution System (PDS) was established during that time in 1990. Until the Oil for Food Program it had to rely mainly on domestically produced food, which covered only 30% of Iraq's needs for cereals, legumes, oils, and sugar on the eve of the Kuwait invasion (Gordon 2010) . Livestock numbers halved in the 1990s as sanctions impeded the import of concentrated fodder (US Congress 2004) . The government sought to revitalize agriculture and expanded acreage (Gibson et al. 2012 ), but failed to raise productivity for lack of input factors (Gazdar and Hussain 2002) . It prioritized cereal and oilseed production and only left production of fruit and vegetables to market forces (Ahmad 2002) .
The PDS rations were not varied and lacked micronutrients. In 1995 rations contained only 1100 cal per person, about half of the minimum requirement for a healthy living. Fruit, vegetables and meat were excluded and so were dairy products, apart from an infant formula. The last, however, had negative nutritional implications for children as it discouraged breast-feeding. Those who did not have the means to procure food on the black market or had a fall back in the form of subsistence farming faced malnutrition and even starvation. The majority of estimates put the excess mortality rate of children who would not have died in the absence of sanctions at 500,000 and more (Gordon 2010) . Still, the PDS was crucial in safeguarding a minimum of food accessibility. Between 1997 and 2003 it accounted for 80% of cereal availability and cereals, especially wheat, accounted for 60% of dietary intake of Iraqis (WFP et al. 2008) .
Some of the most salient food security challenges occurred on the level of utilization, as intermittent electricity supplies, insufficient sanitation and unrepaired infrastructure that was damaged during the war caused a steep rise in water borne diseases, affecting mothers and children in particular (UNICEF and Central Statistical Organizations 1997; UNICEF et al. 2001) . Stability of the three dimensions of food security (availability, accessibility, utilization) was compromised by the persistent state of political uncertainty. After the end of the embargo in 2003, Iraq witnessed a food import boom. Food availability improved and better economic indicators helped food accessibility during the second half of the decade, but food security issues of utilization and stability persisted and after 2012 a renewed deterioration of food security set in.
The post-Saddam years and the transformation of authoritarianism Food security was not the only motivation for the PDS. It allowed a means by which the population could be controlled; rations could be withdrawn from opponents, deserters and their families and cronies were rewarded via the smuggling business and kick-backs (Mazaheri 2010; Baath Party Regional Command 1994-96; Overington 2007) . The PDS has been part of a wider system of redistribution of oil rents that was increasingly characterized by allocation of favors along tribal lines when the authoritarian regime of Saddam Hussein had to retrench as a result of the economic crisis of the 1990s (Sassoon 2012; Baram 1997) . The importance of the secular Baath party and other populist organizations that had played a more preeminent role in former regime episodes declined. Statist agency was increasingly assumed by Blocalized social structures, transnational trade networks and a globalized sanctions regime^ (Parker and Moore 2007) . Often the regime could only assert indirect and limited control. The US occupation of Iraq brought an end to sanctions after 2003, but only a piecemeal process of reconstruction. It was mired in corruption that was abetted by the ineptitude of US occupation forces and national politicians who jockeyed for positions ( Buttressed by high oil prices, Iraq witnessed appealing economic growth between 2006 and 2013. Resource allocation was inefficient and fraught with corruption, but high inputs assured that some modicum of progress trickled down to the general population. GDP per capita in constant prices rose by a third between 2007 and 2013 and then declined by 7 % until 2015 (IMF 2015b). However, the provision of basic services such as electricity and economic diversification beyond oil was found wanting and agriculture was hampered by insufficient capacities (see section 3.4). The oil price slump since the second half of 2014 and the military spending needs to counter the ISIS threat have curtailed fiscal capacities of Iraq and clouded its economic prospects.
The role of the PDS today
The World Bank has argued that the PDS is inefficient and expensive and should be replaced by targeted subsidies, yet it acknowledges that it has been crucial in reaching the poor and assuring their food security (World Bank 2005 Amendola et al. 2010) . Theoretically it covers 99% of the people, provides 85% of required calories and 68% of those actually consumed (World Bank et al. 2011) . In 2007 the WFP and COSIT (World Bank and Central Organization for Statistics and Information Technology) estimated that the proportion of food insecure Iraqis would increase from 3.1% to 25% should PDS be abolished (WFP et al. 2008 ). Non-skilled and agricultural workers, female-headed households and unemployed heads of households are the most vulnerable. Dependence on PDS rations has been particularly pronounced in rural areas where the poverty rate stands at 39.3% as opposed to urban areas where it stands at 16.1% (World Bank et al. 2011) . Rural households spend more of their disposable income on food, have a higher proportion of stunted children and their access to sufficiently iodized salt is more limited, with only 20% as opposed to 32% in urban areas. Iodine deficiency is regarded as the single most important cause of mental retardation and could be addressed with increased access to iodized salt (UNICEF et al. 2012) . Southern governorates and Ninewa in the North are particularly affected by poverty. The KRI is doing better, possibly because of a lower rural population, lower fertility rate and relative economic prosperity and political stability. KRI also has higher levels of schooling for children, even though illiteracy rates among its adults are higher than in the rest of the country (World Bank et al. 2011; WFP et al. 2008; World Bank 2013) .
Disruption of the PDS as a result of unrest has had a negative impact on food security. In 2011 80% received at least one PDS item each month, but fewer than 5 % received the complete package, with coverage of sugar, infant formula, oils and fats particularly low (ILO et al. 2013) . The PDS has seen increased disruptions as a result of the ISIS onslaught. The FAO, WFP, Relief International and Islam Relief Worldwide undertook a number of rapid food security assessments in February 2015 in Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk and Baghdad and in July 2015 in the Kurdistan region of Iraq (FAO et al. 2015a; . There has been a considerable increase of food insecurity, especially among households that rely on agriculture for a living and among IDP and refugees, whose number stood at 3.5 million at the end of 2015 (International Organization for Migration (IOM) 2015; UNHCR 2016). Additionally, the food security of about four million non-displaced Iraqis, who rely on the PDS for more than half of their caloric intake, has been compromised (Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and FAO 2014).
As access to the PDS depends on residency status, many IDP faced peculiar problems when they were unable to change their residency status or faced bureaucratic delays. Some of these delays were perceived to be deliberate as individual provinces were reluctant to host IDP from different ethnic or religious communities out of concern for security and the sectarian composition of their population (Personal interviews, Erbil, September 2015). PDS coverage among IDP was particularly low in KRI, reaching only 7% in Erbil and 26% in Sulaimaniyya (REACH 2015). As negative coping mechanisms come to their limit and, in many cases, displacement becomes more permanent, the focus of relief agencies has shifted from emergency aid to job creation and resilient livelihood strategies, (Guiu and Siddiqui 2015) .
In 2008 the government of Iraq allocated 8.6% ($3.6 billion) of its total budget to the PDS, which is considered the world's largest public food program (WFP et al. 2008) . PDS reform gained pace in 2009 when the Council of Ministers issued decision #369. It cut the ration basket from ten to five commodities (wheat, rice, vegetable oil, sugar and infant formula), envisaged socio-economic targeting based on the poverty line established by the World Bank and stopped PDS rations to Iraqis with a monthly income above 1.5 million Iraqi Dinar (WFP 2014). Further reforms were envisaged, such as work for food vouchers and an increased reliance on domestic food production for the PDS. Even self-sufficiency of the country was deemed possible (Al Khouri 2009).
Agricultural policies
Domestic agriculture, which was neglected after the oil boom of the 1970s, witnessed a forced and limited resuscitation during the sanctions period and has faced increased competition from imports since 2003. Conflict led to reduced acreage along the Euphrates, especially between 2007 and 2011 before recovering slightly afterwards (Gibson et al. 2016) . The oil boom of the 2000s also diverted attention from agriculture (Zurayk 2011) . Its contribution to GDP declined from 9 % in 2002 to 3.6% in 2009 (Lucani and Saade 2012) . While the share of agriculture in GDP is now negligible, it still plays a role in livelihood strategies. Self-employed farmers are 14% of the workforce and agricultural laborers another 4 %, while 26% of households reported having an agricultural plot (WFP et al. 2008) .
Negative environmental factors played against agriculture. There were droughts during the second half of the 2000s and again in 2014. Turkish dam and irrigation projects caused reduced water flows via the Euphrates and Tigris. Aquifers became depleted as well drilling rose steeply (Kelley et al. 2015; Voss et al. 2013; Chulov 2009; Jaafar and Woertz 2016 ). Yet Prime Minister Maliki launched a ten-year Agricultural Initiative in 2007 that aimed at achieving selfsufficiency in staple crops such as cereals (Lucani and Saade 2012) , a concern that is widespread in the Middle East at large (Harrigan 2014; Woertz 2013) . It has been salient in earlier state led Iraqi policy making, alongside supply side solutions such as land reclamation and drainage of saline soils (Telleria et al. 2012; Schnepf 2004) . Strategic concerns about grain self-sufficiency are in contrast to liberal policy prescription by institutions like USAID, which argue that Iraq has no comparative advantage in land intensive irrigated grain cultivation. Instead, it should explore labor-intensive opportunities in fruit, vegetables and livestock production. To achieve these goals USAID recommends subsidy reform, technology import and private sector participation (USAID 2011).
The Agricultural Initiative was followed by the National Development Plan 2010-14, which identified agriculture as one of six priority areas. It eyed a dramatic area expansion of semi irrigated wheat production from 70 k hectares to 170 k hectares, with increased productivity of over 40% ( The focus on agriculture and improved self-sufficiency threatened to cloud other aspects of food security, such as micronutrient programs, social safety nets and policies to promote rural development and gender participation (WFP et al. 2008) .
There has been a supply side response to the agricultural support measures that was aided by improved rainfalls after the drought in the years 2007-09. Wheat production almost doubled until 2014/15 (USDA 2016). However, conflict has had a negative impact on agriculture. In 2014 large parts of the Iraqi wheat belt came under the control of ISIS. The crop cycle in Anbar, Ninewah, Salah Al-Din and Diyala, as well as South Baghdad and Northern Babil was Blargely interrupted( Action Contre la Faim (ACF) and FAO 2014) with supply chains of input factors such as seeds and fertilizers particularly affected (FAO et al. 2015a ).
Yet the damage might not have been as extensive as feared. Rainfalls were good in 2015 and ISIS has regarded food related infrastructure, such as silos, as strategic assets, which it has sought to take over intact. It has managed to maintain rainfed agricultural production as an analysis of satellite imagery reveals and uses taxation of food supply chains as a source of income, especially of wheat, which it tries to smuggle into the subsidized procurement system of the Iraqi government (Jaafar and Woertz 2016) .
The rise and fall of Iraqi food security 2003-15
Food security in Iraq is serious, though not alarming according to the Global Hunger Index of IFPRI, Welthungerhilfe and Concern Worldwide. The source data for the GHI scores come from international organizations and are constantly revised. Hence, GHI scores from different years are not comparable, but the compiling institutions have recalculated them with a revised formula for a number of key years, which makes comparisons possible. In 2015 the GHI stood at 22.2, a slight improvement since 2005 and 2000, when it was higher at 23.6 and 25 respectively, but still considerably worse than the pre-sanction level of 1990 when it stood around 17, before rising steeply to around 24 in 1995 (IFPRI et al. 2015) .
With a Gini co-efficient of .31, income inequality in Iraq is low, but so are living standards. After deriving a poverty line from its socio-economic survey in 2007 with a cost basic needs approach, the World Bank found that most poor and non-poor households were close to the poverty line, hovering only slightly below and above it. They are highly vulnerable to personal shocks (e.g. disease, accidents) and macro-shocks (e.g. food prices, slowing GDP growth) (World Bank et al. 2011; Vecchi 2010a, 2010b (ILO et al. 2013) . In comparison, the WFP survey estimated a much higher share of food expenditure of 52% of disposable income in 2007/08 (WFP et al. 2008) .
The WFP attributed an improvement of food security at the end of 2007 to a reduction of conflict and violent civilian deaths, improved macroeconomic indicators and humanitarian aid. The IKN survey in 2011 saw a slight improvement in living conditions compared to 2007; only 22% of people had to resort to negative coping mechanisms such as consumption reduction and asset sales as opposed to 29% in 2007 (ILO et al. 2013) . The World Bank has seen increased spending and a fall of poverty rates from 23.6% in 2007 to 19. 8% in 2012 (World Bank 2013 .
In contrast, Iraqis have reported mostly deteriorating living conditions in the representative Gallup World Poll surveys from 2008 to 2015, especially after 2012 (see Table 1 ).
Over the same period when Iraqis reported deteriorating living conditions, Iraq increased its oil production by over 50% and oil prices remained high most of the time (see Fig. 1 ). After a short lived correction in 2008/09 they only fell below $100 per barrel in the second half of 2014. Hence the revenue situation of the heavily oil dependent Iraqi economy was relatively comfortable over the period. GDP per capita showed considerable growth, only declining slightly in 2014/15 and production of wheat, the country's most important staple crop, rose steeply after the drought in 2009 and production incentives of the Iraqi government.
Major macroeconomic indicators were positive during the very period when Iraqi perceptions about living conditions and food security deteriorated. A likely culprit is the worsening security situation: violent civilian deaths had decreased in the wake of the American troop Surge that assisted Sunni tribal forces in countering the Islamic State of Iraq, but they rose again steeply after 2012, culminating in the ISIS onslaught in 2014. Another factor could be the reduction of covered items of the PDS after 2009. Source: Gallup 2016 This is also reflected in a correlation analysis of the data. Apart from the highly correlated attitudinal data about perceived living conditions, negative perceived food security shows the highest correlation with violent civilian deaths (see Table 2 ).
Perceived food security in Iraq decreased, despite improved economic macro indicators, most likely because of the deteriorating security situation and related political factors. This is also borne out by our qualitative survey among Iraqi academics.
Iraqi views on food security: results from an expert survey
An online survey was conducted among a snowball sample of 152 Iraqi experts according to the methodology outlined in section 2. As such it explores the views on food security of the respective Iraqi experts rather than Iraqi academics in general and does not necessarily reflect the food security situation of the respondents or the Iraqi population in general.
The sample consisted of a privileged stratum of the population, mostly academics (99%), who could rely on a regular government salary (86%). Most of them (87%) said that they were food secure. Household income, ownership ratio of appliances like cars and computers were far above the average of the Iraqi population. Computers for example were owned by 95%, in comparison to 12% among the general population (WFP et al. 2008 ). Most of them had been living in their respective provinces for more than 20 years (81%) and had presumably not directly suffered from displacement. Only 3.3% had changed location over the last two years. Men constituted 80% of the sample and women 20%. In terms of geographic distribution 34% came from Baghdad and 36% from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) . This is reflective of the concentration of universities in Baghdad and a relatively strong and open university system in KRI, where universities have advanced website presences and staff tend to be better connected via e-mail and the Internet. The strong presence of international organizations, government institutions and NGOs in Erbil and Baghdad was another factor. The southern provinces of Basrah Food Security in Iraq(7 %), Najaf (7 %) and Kerbela (4 %) followed. Other provinces had shares of 2 % and less. There was one participant each from the conflict regions of Al Anbar and Ninewa. About 79% worked at universities, 9 % in ministries and the rest at other institutions (e.g. international organizations, journalism and NGOs). Except for one, all participants were academics, two thirds had a PhD, 21% an MA or MBA and 12% a Bachelor degree. In terms of academic specialization, economics dominated with 36%, followed by engineering (22%), humanities and social sciences (18%), natural sciences (11%) and agriculture (8 %).
The best food security situation according to the sample was in the 1970s and 1980s when it was deemed Bgood^on average. The worst was during the UN sanctions in the 1990s when it was rated close to Bbad^, especially in the first half of that decade when embargo relief via the Oil for Food program was not yet available. There was an improvement of perceived food security in 2004-2007 when it was rated Bneither good nor bad^on average, with a slight deterioration below that level since 2008. Most of the sample thought that food security had stayed the same over the last two years (42%), but 33% thought that it had deteriorated or even deteriorated very much (17%). Only 9 % thought that food security had improved over the last two years.
Considerable importance was attributed to the Public Distribution System (PDS), in line with its overwhelming importance in Iraq. A majority of the sample believed that many people would be food insecure without it (57%); among participants from ministries it was even 79%. The PDS was deemed Bvery important^for food security by 30% of the sample and as Bimportant^by 32%. Another 11% believed abolition of the PDS would lead to cut backs in non-food consumption, but not to outright food insecurity. Over a quarter deemed the PDS only Bhelpful^and 7 % thought that people could live without it. In the comment section at the end of the survey, some called for an abolition of the PDS and its replacement with a more marketbased system. They deemed the PDS inefficient and sometimes prone to corruption and distribution bias. Most of the sample believed that there were only limited coverage gaps of the PDS: 5% thought that Ball^the population was covered, 36% believed that Bmost^of it was covered, and 42% believed that at least Bmany^were covered.
In terms of perceptions about main food suppliers to Iraq a certain divergence with trade statistics could be observed. Neighboring countries like Turkey, Iran and Syria stood out, but also Saudi Arabia and, surprisingly, Kuwait. While these countries are major suppliers of fruit, vegetables, poultry and dairy products to Iraq (in the case of Kuwait as re-exporter), large suppliers of cereals, dairy and poultry like North America, Australia, Western Europe and Brazil ranked less prominently in the answers (International Trade Center 2016) .
In terms of concrete policy measures the highest scores (out of five) were achieved by continuous electricity provision (4.7), a water agreement with Turkey and Syria (4.7), improved water distribution and purification (4.6), income generation for the poor (4.6), improved dryland farming (4.5), maternal health support (4.4), combating soil salinity (4.4), more sprinkler irrigation (4.4), improved seeds (4.3), surveillance and metering of groundwater pumping (4.3), more producer subsidies and financing for farmers (4.3 and 4.2) and more foreign direct investment in agriculture (4.0). Specific nutrition interventions such as fortification of wheat flour with iron and iodization of salt that have been highlighted as urgent priorities by international organizations (see section 3.4) had relatively high responses in the BI don't know category( 18.4% and 7.9% respectively) and scored relatively low (3.0 and 3.6 respectively). The same is true for a replacement of the PDS with targeted financial aids for the poor (3.1), birth control (3.4) and a shift of agricultural production from cereals to fruit and vegetables that contain more value added (3.4).
The KRI is semi-autonomous and under a different administration from the rest of Iraq. It enjoys higher human development indicators and a better institutional framework. Yet answers of survey participants from the KRI did not differ materially from others; there were only some divergences for lack of water (−9%), unreliable supplies from international markets (+12%), food waste (+11%) and foreign competition in agriculture (−9%). KRI participants regarded Syrian agricultural supplies as much less important, despite their geographic proximity to the neighboring country. KRI participants also saw the historic food security situation much worse in the 1970s and 1980s, but differed little from other Iraqi participants for the 1990s and not at all for the 2000s. Interestingly, KRI participants viewed the PDS as less indispensable for food security than other Iraqis (43% vs. 65%).
Women did not differ much from men in their assessment of major food security challenges, apart from the lack of water for agriculture and drinking, one-sided nutrition and lack of agricultural producer subsidies, which they all ranked about 11% higher. Their assessment of the food security situation was also slightly worse, especially since 2008 (−9%), but they attributed less importance to the PDS than men (50% vs. 58%). Women ranked nutritional interventions and maternal health support higher than men but, like them, attributed limited importance to birth control.
Those who had changed their place of residence over the last two years, which possibly signaled a displacement, regarded the food security situation over this time period considerably worse than the average (−8%), felt the PDS was more important (+11%) and spotted more coverage gaps, but all of them said that they would not face any personal food insecurity. Compared to economists, engineers tended to regard social issues such as corruption, social inequality and population growth and the PDS as less important for food security, but scored higher in more technical areas such as water scarcity.
Out of 152 respondents, 115 left more extensive individual comments at the end of the survey about the main food security challenges in Iraq. These answers were coded according to six different categories, depending on what challenges the respondents identified: Economic, Institutional, Political, Natural, Technical and Social (Fig. 2) . The category Economic represents respondents who believed that the right economic policies were missing and that they could successfully address Iraqi food security challenges if they were implemented. Opinions about what the Bright^policies were diverged considerably. They ranged from more protection for domestic producers to a market based reform of the PDS to diversification away from oil (88% said oil income is Bvery important^for financing food imports). The category Institutional describes institutional shortcomings that prevented policy implementation, namely widespread corruption. Corruption also scored highly in a preceding survey question where over three quarters identified corruption and political instability as Bvery important^negative influences on food security. The category Political represents answers that saw political factors as main impediments to food security such as political instability or the lack of negotiations over water rights with Turkey. All three (economic, institutional and political) were mentioned more often than the categories Natural (e.g. lack of water, soil salinity, climate change, dust storms), Technical (recommendations for implementation of a concrete technical measure like drip irrigation or better storage to reduce food waste) and Social (e.g. population growth, rural flight to the cities).
Among the most mentioned issues were foreign competition and lack of support for domestic agriculture, excessive reliance on oil revenues at the expense of other sectors, corruption, the political unrest resulting from the ISIS onslaught, water issues and other environmental factors like salinity of soils, distribution biases in the PDS, lack of infrastructure all along the agricultural value chain, land rights issues resulting from incomplete land reform and tribal ownership of land, and lack of cooperation with foreign institutions and know-how transfer.
Some typical answers were: BImports should be limited. Cities shouldn't expand on agricultural areas, which are sold to rich people to use land and water for villas^, or: BIraq needs to increase its share of the [Euphrates and Tigris] water^. Another argued, Bthe rationing card is the true reason for the demise of the agricultural sector, farmers should be encouraged to be self-sufficient^. In contrast another said, Bthe PDS is not fair at all and the government is not encouraging domestic agricultural production^. Yet another opined that Bthe major food security challenges are corruption, instability, weak institutions and oil dependence without support for other economic sectors, so I can say that Iraq is not a country anymore^.
Overall the survey suggests a belief in political Bdoabilityî f the Bright^economic policies were implemented. Yet trust in political authorities to implement such policies is low, given the concerns about corruption and political instability. The sample thus echoes the negative perceptions of such authorities in the Gallup polls, where the national government and the judiciary were deemed significantly less trustworthy than the military and the local police (Gallup 2016 A large part of the sample (36%) was not aware of Iraq's National Development Plan 2013-17; even among participants from ministries, 29% did not know about it. This suggests a lack of communication of government policies or a lack of interest and trust in them, even among academic expert circles.
The views about what policy choices would be the Bright^ones differed considerably. Social factors, natural constraints and nutrition interventions attracted less attention than top-down technical approaches and concerns about self-sufficiency. As such there was considerable divergence with recommendations of international donor agencies, although there was large agreement on the need to diversify Iraq's oil based economy.
Conclusion
Strategies to enhance food security, such as safety nets, family planning, education, agricultural production and rural livelihoods and reduced exposure to market volatility via storage and hedging policies are crucial in Iraq as they are in the Middle East at large (Lampietti et al. 2011 ). Yet political factors play an overwhelming role in Iraqi food security, its past challenges and its current deterioration. There is considerable divergence between socio-economic surveys that showed improvements of food security between 2003 and 2011 and opinion surveys that show a deterioration of perceived food security among Iraqis since 2009. Favorable macro factors like increased oil and wheat production and GDP per capita Food Security in Iraqgrowth were not able to counter this trend and the current low oil price/high conflict environment will likely add to negative pressures. Technical policy recommendations such as economic diversification, income generation or a reform of the PDS towards more targeted subsidies and transfer payments are well taken, but are unlikely to provide solutions unless problems of conflict, corruption and disenfranchisement can be tackled.
Patronage networks along tribal lines have become part of the socio-political fabric of Iraq in the late Saddam years. Institutional weakness and the exclusion of former elites by returning exile politicians in the wake of De-Baathification exacerbated sectarianism after 2003 when the Maliki regime sought to re-establish a new authoritarianism, this time with Shiite leanings. It remains to be hoped that Iraq can overcome this authoritarian and sectarian legacy. Considerable consensus exists about the negative impact of bad governance across sectarian and political divides as a series of public demonstrations in 2015 and 2016 has shown. Such overarching concerns were also reflected in our qualitative survey among Iraqi experts. Addressing them will be a precondition for coping with Iraq's socio-economic and environmental malaise that affects its food security.
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